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Preface 
 
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance 
of another.  
  Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784) 
 
In an essay bearing the same title, Michel Foucault read Kant’s text against the backdrop 
of his critique of reason, published just three years earlier. It is precisely at the moment 
that we assert ourselves as mature beings, Foucault observed, that it is most important to 
recognize the limits of reason. “It is precisely at this moment that the critique is 
necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is 
legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be 
hoped” (1997:308). Foucault warned us, with Kant, that reliance on reason beyond its 
proper bounds would merely set the clock back: “Illegitimate uses of reason are what 
give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, along with illusion” (1997:308). The careful and 
critical use of reason, in contrast, is what enlightens and leads forward, out of the 
shadows of illusion. But it can only do so relying on itself. The modern period would 
embrace a self-conception of self-reliance—carefully bounded by critique. 
 Foucault also saw in Kant’s essay a new philosophical attitude consisting of 
genuine reflection on the “present”—a turning of the more traditional, eternal gaze of the 
philosopher onto the contemporary moment, and, with that, an associated task of 
theorizing knowledge in relation to current times. Foucault dubbed this “the attitude of 
modernity” and located its resonance in the writings of nineteenth and twentieth century 
authors, starting foremost with Charles Baudelaire. “By ‘attitude,’” Foucault wrote, “I 
mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain 
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that 
at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task” 
(1997:309). This attitude brought together philosophical inquiry with critical thought 
focused on contemporary historical actuality. Philosophical training and reflection would 
now apply themselves to the contemporary moment—most notably, the French 
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revolution—and concentrate on reasoning through the present. Foucault saw in Kant the 
origin of a modern attitude that would run through Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Durkheim, 
Rusche and Kirchheimer.  
 In another essay bearing the same title, Jürgen Habermas adds: “Surprisingly, in 
the last sentence of his lecture Foucault includes himself in this tradition” (1994:150).  
 Once again, the attitude of modernity triumphed over the critique of reason. In 
these pages, I argue that the two strands Foucault identified in Kant’s essay—the crucial 
moment of critical reason and the modern attitude—collided throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, and that the modern attitude repeatedly prevailed. Even when the 
moderns were engaged in the most critical of enterprises, the attitude gained the upper 
hand and offered up new ways of conceptualizing and making sense of the present, 
consistently beyond the limits of reason. Never daunted by those warnings about 
illusions, never chastened by the foolish excesses of earlier generations, modern thinkers 
continued to theorize contemporary historical actuality beyond reason’s bounds.  
 I propose, today, that we finally abandon the misguided attitude of modernity. It 
will mean, no doubt, leaving much to chance. This is all for the better. Let me explain.  
 
 
1. 
 
The moderns posed three questions of punishment. The first, born of the Enlightenment 
itself, sought to identify and define a rational basis for punishing. As men freed 
themselves from the shackles of religious faith, this first question took shape: If 
theologians can no longer ground political and legal right, then on what foundation does 
the sovereign’s right to punish rest? On what basis does the state have a right to punish its 
citizens? Naturally, the question was not entirely innocent—no good questions ever are. 
It was animated by a desire to locate the righteous limits of the sovereign’s punitive 
power at a time that was marked—at least in the eyes of many of the first modern men of 
reason—by excessive punishments. The right to punish, it turns out, would serve to limit 
punishment. 
 “Here, then, is the foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish crimes,” a young, 
twenty-five-year-old Cesare Beccaria would declare in 1764: “the necessity of defending 
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the repository of the public well-being from the usurpations of individuals” (1995:10). 
The origin of the right, Beccaria explained, derived from the sovereign’s duty to promote 
“the greatest happiness shared among the greater number” (1995:7). Through his disciple, 
Jeremy Bentham, Beccaria’s writings would translate into more conventional theories of 
utilitarianism and deterrence and, later, economic models of social welfare maximization. 
Other early moderns would derive the right to punish elsewhere—in the autonomy or 
dignity of the moral agent, in the interests of enlightened self-development, in the harm 
principle, and in those other traditional expressions of legal right.  
 This first line of inquiry endures well into the present. In the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, the answers draw heavily on a functional analysis of the criminal sanction. In 
the classic debate over the legal enforcement of morality, for instance, all the major 
contributors—from H.L.A. Hart (1963:14) and Patrick Devlin (1965:2–3), to Ernest 
Nagel (1968:138–39), Norval Morris (Morris and Hawkins 1970:4), Joel Feinberg (1987) 
and others—start from the statement of function articulated in the Wolfenden Report of 
1957: “the function of the criminal law . . . is to preserve public order and decency, to 
protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient 
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others.” Liberal theorists would relate 
this back to John Stuart Mill’s earlier pronouncements in On Liberty, while legal 
moralists would argue for the centrality of upholding morality as the main function of the 
criminal law. “The criminal law as we know it is based upon moral principle,” Devlin 
argued. “In a number of crimes its function is simply to enforce a moral principle and 
nothing else” (Devlin 1965: 7). On both sides of the debate, the sovereign’s “right to 
punish” derived from identifying the proper function of the criminal sanction. 
 Although this first discourse continues today, it did not take long for men of 
knowledge—as Nietzsche described himself—to spot the error in this line of inquiry. The 
right to punish, after all, was precisely what defined sovereignty and, as such, could 
hardly serve to constrain sovereign power. The first question had gotten things 
backwards: the “right to punish” was what the sovereign achieved by persuading its 
members that it could best promote the legitimate goals of punishment. To seek the origin 
of the right to punish by analyzing the purposes or utilities of punishment would lead 
nowhere. “The ‘purpose of law,’” Nietzsche declared, “is absolutely the last thing to 
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employ in the history of the origin of law: . . . whatever exists, having somehow come 
into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and 
redirected by some power superior to it” (1967: 77).  
 It was fruitless to look for the right to punish in its purposes, utilities, or 
functions—whether from a utilitarian or deontological perspective. “[P]urposes and 
utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful 
and imposed upon it the character of a function,” Nietzsche emphasized (1967: 77). The 
proper question to ask of the “right to punish,” then, was not “on what ground,” “of what 
origin,” or “from where” but rather: “How does the sovereign’s act of punishing become 
perceived as legitimate?” Or better yet, “Under what conditions does the sovereign’s 
exercise of that power of punishing not trigger sufficient resistance to undermine 
sovereignty itself?” That question, however, did not call for philosophical debate over 
rights, deontological argument about autonomy, or econometric analyses of deterrence. It 
called for historical, sociological, political and genealogical research about acts of 
resistance, social movements, transformative moments, ideology, and social cohesion. It 
called for a genealogy of morals, law, and power—in sum, a genealogy of punishment.   
 With the birth of the social sciences in the late nineteenth century, this critical 
impulse gave rise to a second line of inquiry. More skeptical, more critical, the questions 
probed and excavated deeper processes and forces: If the rational discourse over the right 
to punish is mere pretext and serves only to hide power formations, then what is it exactly 
that punishment practices do for us? What is the true function of punishment? What is it 
that we do when we punish? From Emile Durkheim to Antonio Gramsci and the later 
Frankfurt School, Michel Foucault, and fin-de-siècle trends in penology, twentieth 
century moderns struggled over social organization, economic production, political 
legitimacy, governance, and the construction of the self—turning punishment practices 
upside down, dissecting not only their repressive functions but more importantly their 
role in constructing the contemporary subject and modern society.  
 At the apex of this second line of inquiry, Michel Foucault would articulate and 
enumerate, in his magisterial book, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, the 
central tasks and rules of engagement. First and foremost, “Do not concentrate the study 
of the punitive mechanisms on their ‘repressive’ effects alone. . . [R]egard punishment as 
November 27, 2006 Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment 5 
 
a complex social function” (1977:23; 1975:28). Foucault explicitly acknowledged that 
this second project built on the work of Emile Durkheim, citing him alone on that same 
page (1975: 28 n.1), and owed much to the Frankfurt School. In the immediate passage 
following his enumeration, Foucault emphasized that “the great book of Rusche et 
Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structures, offers a number of essential reference 
points” (1975:29): 
 
We must first rid ourselves of the illusion that penality is above all (if not 
exclusively) a means of reducing crime. . . We must analyse rather the ‘concrete 
systems of punishment’, study them as social phenomena that cannot be 
accounted for by the juridical structure of society alone. . . ; we must situate them 
in their field of operation, in which the punishment of crime is not the sole 
element; we must show that punitive measures are not simply ‘negative’ 
mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; 
but that they are linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects which it is 
their task to support (Foucault 1979:24; 1975:29–30).  
 
 All this, from the Frankfurt School. The key task that emerged from that second 
line of inquiry, then, was to unearth the deeper forces and relations of power that, through 
the means of punitive practices, shape us as contemporary subjects. To explore, in effect, 
“How a specific mode of subjugation could give birth to man as an object of knowledge 
for a discourse with scientific status” (1975:28–29). To discover and trace the deeper 
forces that shape our punitive practices and, through them, our knowledge of ourselves.  
 However, a series of further critiques—critiques of metanarratives, functionalism, 
and scientific objectivity—would chasten this line of inquiry and nudge it around the 
cultural turn, helping shape a third discourse on punishment. This line of inquiry would 
focus not on what punishment is doing for us, but on what punishment tells us about 
ourselves: What do our punishment practices tell us about our cultural values? What is 
the social meaning of our institutions of punishment? Less meta-theoretical, less critical-
theoretic, this final set of questions would build on, while simultaneously trying to avoid, 
the searing critique of the construction of knowledge. The questions were intended to be 
less normative. A description at most. A compelling interpretation. Something to make 
sense of our world and ourselves. Something to ground, perhaps later, an evaluation of 
those punishment practices. 
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 The difference was subtle, but important. The second set of questions—especially 
as they evolved over the course of the twentieth century—had become increasingly 
focused on the constructed nature of knowledge, what has come to be known as the 
“power/knowledge” critique: How, exactly, do we come to believe what we hold as true? 
How is it, for instance, that we come to believe a progress narrative of punishment? What 
institutions and practices shape us to believe in the idea of the “delinquent”—or, for that 
matter, in the idea that we could possibly “rehabilitate” or “correct” that “delinquent”? 
How have our own disciplinary practices contributed to shaping our beliefs? By the late 
twentieth century, this second set of questions had begun to revolve entirely around the 
formation of knowledge and to constitute an acid-test for all knowledge claims regarding 
punishment.  
 In contrast, the third set of questions—the product, as I mentioned, of a critique of 
metanarratives—tried assiduously to avoid the power/knowledge critique. It cut a more 
humble profile. It sought only to reflect on what our punishment practices tell us about 
ourselves, our values, our society—as a mere prolegomenon to a better understanding of 
punishment, to make possible, later, a better evaluation of our practices and institutions. 
David Garland’s book, Punishment and Modern Society (1990), though ostensibly a 
pedagogic treatment of the four leading voices in the sociology of punishment, reflects 
well this third line of inquiry. “The social meaning of punishment is badly understood,” 
Garland contends. What is needed is “a descriptive prolegomenon which sets out the 
social foundations of punishment, its characteristic modern forms, and its social 
significance” (1990:9). The social meaning of punishment “needs to be explored if we are 
to discover ways of punishing which better accord with our social ideals” (1990:1).  
 This line of inquiry represents, in Garland’s words, “a deliberate attempt to shift 
the sociology of punishment away from its recent tendency—engendered by Foucault and 
the Marxists—to view the penal system more or less exclusively as an apparatus of power 
and control” (1990:1–2). The task is to develop “a pluralistic, multidimensional 
approach,” “a rounded, completed image; a recomposition of the fragmentary views 
developed by more narrowly focused studies” (280). To explore “multiple causality, 
multiple effects, and multiple meaning” (280). Garland explains: 
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 Values, conceptions, sensibilities, and social meanings—culture, in 
short—do not exist in the form of a natural atmosphere which envelopes social 
action and makes it meaningful. Rather, they are actively created and recreated 
by our social practices and institutions—and punishment plays its part in this 
generative and regenerative process. (Garland 1990:251) 
 
In this sense, the third line of inquiry calls for richly textured, thick descriptions of our 
punishment practices intended to expose their social meaning and their role in shaping 
the fabric of society. All this to serve as a preparatory to normative analysis—to provide 
“a proper descriptive basis for normative judgments about penal policy” (1990:10). 
 It is not entirely clear, however, whether such an endeavor can escape the 
power/knowledge critique. If Foucault’s disciplinary hypotheses were themselves 
susceptible, surely an interpretation of the “social meaning” of punishment practices and 
institutions would also be vulnerable. Any interpretation would tell us more about the 
interpreter and her belief systems, than about the meaning of the practice itself. Surely the 
semiotic enterprise would reveal more about the modes of reasoning, beliefs, and ethical 
choices held by the individual interpreter than about the social meaning of the 
punishment practices themselves.  
 The closing paragraphs of Garland’s book are revealing in this respect. Modern 
societies, Garland writes, should expect less from punishment and “might be encouraged 
to treat it instead as a form of social policy which should, where possible, be minimized” 
(1990:292). The goal should be to socialize and integrate young citizens, not punish 
them: “a work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy. And to the 
extent that punishment is deemed unavoidable, it should be viewed as a morally 
expressive undertaking rather than a purely instrumental one” (1990:292). These, I take 
it, are significant normative commitments that, in all likelihood, bleed into and color a 
cultural critic’s interpretation of the social meaning of punishment practices.   
 As dusk fell on the twentieth century, modern writings on punishment continued 
to reflect more on the authors than on the punishments. Somehow, despite the 
reformulation of the questions, the texts still told us more about the interpreter’s beliefs, 
intuitions, and ethical choices, than about the practices of punishment and their social 
meaning.   
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2. 
 
What do we do now—now that we have seen what lies around the cultural bend and 
realize, painfully, that the same critiques apply with equal force to any interpretation of 
cultural meaning that we could possibly slap on our contemporary punishment practices? 
Should we continue to labor on this final set of questions, return to an earlier set, or, as all 
our predecessors did, craft a new line of inquiry? What question shall we—children of 
the 21st century—pose of our punishment practices and institutions? 
 The answer, paradoxically, is that it does not matter. The formulation of the 
questions themselves never really mattered, except perhaps to distinguish the analytic 
philosopher from the critical theorist, the positivist from the cultural critic—minor 
differences that reflected nothing more than taste, desire, personal aptitude, upbringing, 
and training. Yes, new questions were formulated and new discourses emerged, but the 
same problem always plagued those modern text.  
 In all the modern texts, there always came this moment when the empirical facts 
ran out or the deductions of principle reached their limit—or both—and yet the reasoning 
continued. There was always this moment, ironically, when the moderns—those paragons 
of reason—took a leap of faith. It is no accident that it was always there, at that precise 
moment, that we learned the most—that we could read from the text and decipher a 
vision of just punishment that was never entirely rational, never purely empirical, and 
never fully determined by the theoretical premises of the author. In each and every case, 
the modern text let slip a leap of faith—a choice about how to resolve a gap, an 
ambiguity, an indeterminacy in an argument of principle or fact.  
 The inevitable space between theoretical or empirical premises and the final 
judgment derives, in the end, from that imperceptible fissure in the human sciences 
between the not-falsified, the not-yet-falsified, the apparently unfalsifiable, the verified 
but only under certain questionable assumptions, and truth. In the empirical domain, no 
less than in philosophical discourse, legal analysis, and public policy debates, proof never 
followed mathematical deduction, but rested instead on assertions—whether empirical or 
logical—that may well have been true, but for which other entirely reasonable hypotheses 
could have been substituted. The key issue was always which hypothesis to believe from 
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among the many possible hypotheses, all of which were consistent with the data; which 
sub-principle to uphold from among all the possible sub-principles that were theoretically 
coherent with the guiding principle. What the moderns chose to believe, ultimately, told 
us more about them than it did about the world around them. It was always the answers 
that moderns gave to the questions—regardless of the question itself—that revealed the 
most about them and their intuitions about just punishment.  
 Ironically, this gap is precisely what made possible the moment of enlightenment 
at the very heart of critical theory—what Raymond Geuss refers to as that reflective 
opening that “gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment 
and emancipation” (1981:2). Once we lifted the veil from our eyes and realized fully that 
our rational belief in certain theories or premises were no better than religious faith—that 
we had taken a leap of faith to arrive at our conclusion—it then became possible to trace 
the genealogy of how we took that leap. It became possible to explore how we came to 
believe what we did believe and at what price. That is precisely what the great critical 
thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth century did along the three principal dimensions 
of radical thought—power (from Nietzsche through Foucault to Agamben), economic 
production (from Marx through the Frankfurt School to Althusser), and desire (from 
Freud through Lacan to Zizek). Not surprisingly, identifying the gap is what also gave 
birth to the American Legal Realist movement in the early twentieth century and the 
Critical Legal Studies movement at mid century. It also made possible deconstruction at 
the end of the century—perhaps the fullest instantiation of the insight.  
 In this respect, Jacques Derrida—no hero of mine, I assure you, far too ambiguous 
and playful for my taste—was entirely right though when he wrote that the foundation of 
law itself rests on a leap of faith—what he refers to as “a performative force, in other 
words always an interpretive force with an appeal to faith” (1994:32). Legal authority 
traces to this act of auto-authorization, itself never subject to a legal evaluation of right or 
wrong—not simply, though certainly, because the legal framework itself post-dates the 
founding moment, but also and more importantly, because the judgment that a 
punishment is just must always overcome the gap between theoretical premises and final 
judgment. The act of reaching the legal conclusion—the just punishment, the sentence, 
the execution—represents “a stroke of force, a violent performative act, and thus an 
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interpretation that is in itself neither just nor unjust” (1994:32–33). And it is precisely in 
this sense that Derrida concludes, paradoxically, that the structure of the law is what 
opens the door to the very possibility of deconstruction itself—thus his playful hypothesis 
that justice makes possible deconstruction (1994:36). Though addressing law and justice, 
Derrida’s point applies equally well to the other disciplines that form the field of crime 
and punishment, such as sociology, politics, economics, and public policy.  
 I said “ironically” earlier because it is precisely the moment of critical perception 
and enlightenment that simultaneously undermines the claims of the radical critical 
theorists—though, sadly, not necessarily those of the deconstructionists.   
 
 
3. 
 
What do these gaps, ambiguities and indeterminacies look like? What does it mean, 
exactly, that the moderns inevitably took a leap of faith? “The empirical facts ran out, the 
deductions of principle reached their limit, and yet the reasoning continued.” What does 
this really sound like? Let me stop for a moment here and give some illustrations. Let me 
demonstrate some gaps and ambiguities.   
 
 Deterrence of Juvenile Offenders1 
 
 First, let’s examine a claim of deterrence. The trouble with most research on 
deterrence is that it is extremely difficult to divorce the effects of deterrence from those 
of incapacitation—from the fact that increased law enforcement will also result in more 
imprisonment and thus greater incapacitation of criminal offenders. The National 
Academy of Sciences appointed a blue-ribbon panel of experts to examine the problem of 
measuring deterrence in 1978—led by Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel 
Nagin—but the results were disappointing: “[B]ecause the potential sources of error in 
the estimates of the deterrent effect of these sanctions are so basic and the results 
sufficiently divergent, no sound, empirically based conclusions can be drawn about the 
                                                 
1 For a full treatment of this illustration, please refer to Bernard E. Harcourt, Language of the Gun: Youth, 
Crime, and Public Policy, Chapter 14 (University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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existence of the effect, and certainly not about its magnitude.”2 Little progress has been 
made since then. As Steven Levitt suggested in 1998, “few of the[] empirical studies 
[regarding deterrence of adults] have any power to distinguish deterrence from 
incapacitation and therefore provide only an indirect test of the economic model of 
crime.”3 
Levitt nevertheless contends that juveniles and young adults are responsive to 
increases in punishment. In order to demonstrate this, Levitt takes a state-level dataset of 
criminal offending rates and classifies states into three categories: first, states that have a 
more severe adult than juvenile criminal justice system; second, states that have similar 
levels of severity for their adult and juvenile criminal justice systems; and third, states 
that have a more lenient adult than juvenile criminal justice system. Levitt then compares 
the relative offending rates of young adults as they turn from juveniles to adults—as they 
reach majority and become subject to the adult criminal justice system.  
Levitt finds that juveniles who have turned adult in the first category of states—
those with relatively more severe adult systems—offend less in their first year of majority 
than they did in the previous year, whereas those juveniles in states with relatively more 
lenient adult systems offend more than they did the previous year.4 Levitt concludes from 
this that deterrence, rather than simply incapacitation, is at work: “Sharp drops in crime at 
the age of majority suggest that deterrence (and not merely incapacitation) plays an 
important role” (1998:1156).  
Why, exactly, do the data confirm the deterrence hypothesis? The answer, Levitt 
suggests, is that: “If deterrence is at work, then one would expect an abrupt change in 
behavior associated with passage to adult status. If, on the other hand, incapacitation is 
                                                 
2 Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent 
and Incapacitative Effects, 42, in Alfred Blumstein et al. Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the 
Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978). 
See also Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in Blumstein, Cohen, and 
Nagin, eds, Deterrence and Incapacitation 95, 135 (deeming current empirical evidence insufficient to 
confirm the existence of a deterrent effect and “woefully inadequate” for estimating its magnitude). See 
generally Spelman 2000: 97 (reviewing the literature on the deterrence hypothesis and noting the studies’ 
inability to separate deterrence from incapacitation or rehabilitation).  
3 Steven D. Levitt, “Juvenile Crime and Punishment,” 106 J Pol Econ 1156, 1158 n 2 (1998). 
4 Specifically, Levitt finds that “In the states in which punishments increase the most with the adult court, 
violent crime rates fall by 3.8 percent for 18-year-olds. In contrast, where the transition to the adult court is 
most lenient, violent crime committed by 18-year-olds increases 23.1 percent. Where the rise in sanctions 
with adult court is intermediate, the rise in violent crime is also intermediate: 10.2 percent” (Levitt 
1998:1175). 
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the primary channel, then one would expect longer delays in the transition from the 
juvenile equilibrium to the adult equilibrium due to lags in the timing of arrest and 
sentencing. . . It seems likely that large immediate changes in behavior associated with 
the age of majority are likely to primarily reflect deterrence” (Levitt 1998:1172). The 
logic of the argument, then, rests on the assumption that deterrence works more speedily 
than incapacitation at the transitional period around majority. 
The trouble with this logic, though, is that there is no metric to test the speed of 
either mechanism alone, nor to compare the speed of the two competing theories. There is 
no way, a priori, to determine how fast either effect would take—whether it is a month, 
two months, three months, six months, nine months, twelve months, eighteen months, 
two years, or more. Levitt’s model uses an annual measure of crime. Yet the 
incapacitation time lag—if there is one—may very well be shorter than that. In fact, if 
true incapacitation theory is correct—the idea that about 6 percent of young adults are 
responsible for about 50 percent of their cohort’s criminal activity—one would expect 
that strict enforcement would have an immediate and sharp incapacitative effect precisely 
at the moment of the release of delinquent youths turning to majority.  
Here, then, is the gap: there is no measure, no metric, no standard against which 
we could declare that an effect on crime—deterrence or incapacitation—is abrupt or 
delayed. Nor is there any way to determine how the two effects would compare. We do 
not have a measure for the incapacitation effect, and a separate one for the deterrence 
effect. We just have one number, and have to guess whether it seems relatively 
immediate or relatively delayed. Since we do not know how long the incapacitation effect 
takes, there is no way of knowing from annual crime data whether the effect looks more 
immediate or more delayed—whether it is incapacitation or deterrence.  
Why is it that Steven Levitt is prepared to skip over this gap and confirm the 
deterrence hypothesis? It doesn’t really matter. I would tend to emphasize taste, desire, 
training, and professional advancement; but there may be other explanations. What does 
matter is that there is a gap and a leap of faith—of faith in rationality—that we can 
identify. Here it is a gap of the not-yet-falsified type. A theory that is consistent with the 
data, but does not exclude other competing hypotheses. It would be wrong to base public 
policy on these empirical findings.  
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Racial profiling5  
 A number of economists contend that the use of racial profiling improves the 
efficiency of policing by increasing the number of successful searches.6 Assuming that 
people respond rationally to the increased cost of offending—assuming rational action 
theory—targeting more police resources at a higher-offending population will reduce 
their rate of offending (given the greater likelihood of being detected and punished). If 
we assume, in addition, that minorities have a higher offending rate than whites, then the 
optimal level of profiling occurs when the offending rate of minorities declines to the 
same level as the offending rate of whites. At that point, the police will maximize the 
number of successful police interventions and have no legitimate interest in profiling 
minorities to any greater extent. The economists verify these conclusions with accurate 
mathematical equations and economic models.  
 Even under these assumptions, however, racial profiling may increase the overall 
societal rate of offending. It all depends on the relative responsiveness of the two 
groups—the profiled minorities and the non-profiled whites—to policing. If minorities 
are less responsive to policing then whites, then their decrease in offending will be 
outweighed, in absolute numbers, by the more elastic responsiveness of whites—i.e. by 
the increased offending of whites in response to the fact that they are being policed less. 
This is true despite the fact that the overall number of successful police interventions 
increases—despite the fact that the police are detecting and punishing more crime. I 
demonstrate this with accurate mathematical equations and economic models in Against 
Prediction (2007). 
 The economists had essentially assumed in their model of racial profiling that 
minorities are as responsive to policing as whites, if not more. If they hadn’t made that 
crucial assumption, then their own models would demonstrate that racial profiling may 
increase the amount of crime in society—which is most definitely not an efficient 
outcome. Their claims are non-falsifiable but only under dubious assumptions. They are 
                                                 
5 For a full treatment of this second illustration, please refer to Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: 
Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, Chapter 4 (University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
6 Leading works in the area include John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor 
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Pol Econ 203 (2001); Rubén Hernández-Murillo and John 
Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?: Testing in Aggregated Data (working paper Apr 18, 2003), 
online at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~jknowles/Research/HKRacProf_2003c.pdf (visited July 27, 2004). 
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mathematically verified, but only if we assume something about the relative elasticity of 
the two groups which we have no ground to assume. (In fact, if minorities have a higher 
offending rate than whites, it is far more likely that the cause of that difference, perhaps 
lower employment opportunities, would lower their responsiveness to policing in 
comparison to whites).  
 This, I take it, is a gap within their own model: even assuming deterrence (which 
itself is, for many, a leap), there is a gap over which these economists took a leap of faith. 
Why? Again, it doesn’t matter. I would speculate that it is because they desire a clean, 
parsimonious, mathematical model that affirms rationality. Maybe that’s why they 
became economists. But again, why they took a leap of faith does not really matter. What 
matters is that they took it and that we can identify it. We should not rely on it to make 
public policy. 
 
Order Maintenance7 
 
 For a third illustration, let’s turn to a modern policing practice. In the early 1990s, 
several major U.S. cities began implementing order-maintenance strategies, most notably 
New York City, in 1994, where then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his first police 
commissioner, William Bratton, put in force the “quality-of-life initiative.” The order-
maintenance strategies rested on the “broken windows” theory—the idea that minor 
neighborhood disorder like graffiti and loitering, if left unattended, will cause serious 
criminal activity (Wilson and Kelling 1982:31).  
 During the 1990s, several proponents of order-maintenance declared that the 
broken windows theory had been empirically verified.8 They rested this assertion on the 
findings of a 1990 study titled Disorder and Decline. Subsequent research discovered 
several gapping flaws in the study that undermine confidence in the findings.9 Even 
                                                 
7 For a full treatment of this third illustration, please refer to Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The 
False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Harvard University Press 2001), and Bernard E. Harcourt and 
Jens Ludwig, “Broken Windows: Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment,” The 
University of Chicago Law Review 73: 271—320 (2006). 
8 For instance, George Kelling, co-author of the 1982 Broken Windows article and of a more recent book 
entitled Fixing Broken Windows, contended that the 1990 study “established the causal links between 
disorder and serious crime—empirically verifying the ‘Broken Windows’ hypotheses” (Kelling & Coles 
1996:24).  
9  See Harcourt, Illusion of Order at 59—78.  
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putting those gaps aside, the 1990 study used a static dataset to test a dynamic hypothesis: 
the data consisted of disorder and robbery victimization at one point in time, whereas the 
broken windows theory posited a developmental sequence over time. The statistical 
analysis could not—and as a result, did not—falsify the broken windows hypothesis. As 
Ralph Taylor succinctly observes, the 1990 study was simply off the mark “because these 
data are cross-sectional, and the thesis is longitudinal” (Taylor 2006: 1626). The gap here 
was between the not-yet-falsified-because-not-really-tested and truth. Again, it was 
inappropriate at the time to form public policy on its basis.  
 Today, the social scientific support for the broken windows theory rests 
principally on a 2001 study co-authored by George Kelling and William Sousa. In their 
study, Kelling and Sousa focus on the 75 police precincts in New York City over the 
period 1989 to 1998. They statistically compare the relationship between violent crime 
and broken-windows policing, as well as three other dependent variables—
unemployment, demographics, and crack cocaine consumption—simulating comparison 
groups by treating the city as 75 separate and comparable entities. Looking at the change 
over time, they find that the measure of broken-windows policing is significantly related 
to the drops in precinct violent crime over the ten-year period—in contrast to 
demographics, unemployment, and drug use patterns, which are not.  
 The trouble with the Kelling and Sousa study is that they do not control for what 
statisticians call “mean reversion.” An examination of their data reveals just that: those 
precincts that experienced the largest drop in crime in the 1990s were the ones that 
experienced the largest increases in crime during the city’s crack epidemic of the mid- to 
late-1980s. In other words, it may well be true that the precincts that received the greatest 
dose of broken windows policing in the 1990s experienced the largest declines in crime. 
But those precincts were precisely the ones that were hit hardest by the crack epidemic 
that fueled homicide rates in New York City from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s. 
Everywhere that crime skyrocketed as a result of the crack epidemic, crime declined 
sharply once the epidemic ebbed—which, it turns out, was also true across the country.  
 In a recent study with Jens Ludwig, we demonstrate that the declines in crime 
observed in New York City in the 1990s are exactly what would have been predicted 
from the rise and fall of the crack epidemic, even if New York had not embarked on its 
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broken windows policing strategy. Jens Ludwig and I call this Newton’s Law of Crime: 
what goes up, must come down, and what goes up the most, tends to come down the 
most. What it represents, in effect, is a competing hypothesis that more fully explains the 
relationship between crime and policing. 
 There’s a third gap—or fourth or fifth, I’ve lost track frankly. Kelling and Sousa 
infer the truth of the broken windows theory—and advocate a public policy of broken 
windows policing—on the basis of a not-falsified hypothesis that coincidentally fails to 
test for a competing explanation. But even if they had tested for mean reversion, we 
would still be left with a non-falsified hypothesis: the broken windows theory has not 
been disproved by Jens Ludwig and my study of the New York City data, we have 
merely offered a different (though in our mind better) explanation of the crime trends.10 
But who is to say which is right? It is, as Ludwig and I suggest, a Scotch verdict: not 
proven. That’s a gap. 
 Why are Kelling and Sousa willing to take a leap of faith and advocate policies 
based on the broken windows theory—a theory that is at best not falsified? It doesn’t 
matter. I think I know why, but of course I may be wrong: George Kelling, the co-author 
of the original Broken Windows article, has a lot invested in its truth, especially now that 
he’s running a consulting business, the Hanover Justice Group, that markets broken-
windows policing methods to city mayors and councils. But again, it really doesn’t 
matter. What matters here is that we’ve identified another gap and a corresponding leap 
of faith.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10  I would suggest that the second half of our study, which focuses on the MTO program, does in fact 
falsify the broken windows hypothesis, but will leave that to another day. In that second part, Jens and I 
explore the empirical results from MTO, a social experiment underway in five cities, including New York, 
Chicago and Los Angeles—three of the largest cities that implemented broken-windows style policing—as 
well as Baltimore and Boston. Under the MTO program, approximately 4,800 low-income families living 
in high-crime public housing communities characterized by high rates of social disorder were randomly 
assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and disorderly communities. Jens and I compare 
the crime rates among those who moved and those who didn’t—using official arrests and self-report 
surveys—and the results are clear, though disappointing: moving people to communities with less social or 
physical disorder on balance does not lead to reductions in their criminal behavior. Neighborhood order and 
disorder do not seem to have a noticeable effect on criminal behavior.  
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 The Harm Principle11 
 
 The gaps are not only empirical. They also inevitably arise in the derivation of 
conclusions from legal and moral principles. A good illustration involves the application 
of the harm principle. If you look honestly at the writings of even the originators and 
chief proponents of the harm principle, it becomes clear that the principle itself cannot 
resolve the central cases for which it was developed.  
 Let’s take the example of prostitution. John Stuart Mill framed the question as 
follows: “Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a 
person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling house?” (Mill 1978: 98). Mill himself 
never answered the question. “There are arguments on both sides,” Mill suggested 
(1978:98). Consistency militated in favor of toleration. On the other hand, pimps 
stimulate fornication for their own profit and society may elect to discourage conduct that 
it regards as, in his words, “bad.” In the end, Mill refused to take a position regarding the 
pimp. “I will not venture to decide whether [the arguments] are sufficient to justify the 
moral anomaly of punishing the accessory when the principal is (and must be) allowed to 
go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator . . . .” (1978:99).  
 H.L.A. Hart also straddled the fence. His nemesis, Patrick Devlin, famously had 
argued that all aspects of prostitution should be prohibited, flipping Mill’s consistency 
thesis on its head: if the law can prohibit brothel-keeping because it is exploitative, then 
surely the law could also regulate prostitution. “All sexual immorality involves the 
exploitation of human weaknesses,” Devlin argued. “The prostitute exploits the lust of 
her customers and the customer the moral weakness of the prostitute” (Devlin 1965: 12). 
In contrast to Devlin, but like Mill, Hart refused to resolve the issue explicitly. Instead, 
Hart reported on the English Street Offences Act of 1959 and endorsed its underlying 
rationale. Under the Act, prostitution was not made illegal, but solicitation in a street or 
public place was. According to Hart, this approach respected the important distinctions 
between public and private, and between immorality and indecency. Hart, who favored 
these distinctions, reported approvingly that “the recent English law relating to 
                                                 
11 For a fuller treatment of this fourth illustration, please refer to Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: 
The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing, Part III (Harvard University Press 2001), and Bernard E. 
Harcourt, “The Collapse of the Harm Principle,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 90: 109—194 
(1999). 
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prostitution attends to this difference. It has not made prostitution a crime but punishes its 
public manifestation in order to protect the ordinary citizen, who is an unwilling witness 
of it in the streets, from something offensive” (1963:45). Hart thus relied on another 
principle—the offense principle—to justify prohibiting the public manifestations of 
prostitution.12 
 Faced with a perfect test case to assess the usefulness of the harm principle, both 
Mill and Hart bunt. Why? Because here, as elsewhere, there are harm arguments on both 
sides of the equation. There is exploitation at the very least, and, as Catherine 
MacKinnon has helped us see, significant harm to women in general. The harm principle 
did not then and does not today resolve the difficult cases at the border of law and 
morality. More moral armature is necessary.  
 
 The Death Penalty 
 
 Modern writings on capital punishment illustrate the indeterminacy of principle 
and fact. Regardless of the discourse—whether in social contract theory, utilitarianism, 
social science, cultural criticism, or even deconstruction—the modern texts reflect more 
than anything the author’s intuition about just punishment, not a correct derivation of 
principle. No matter how the inquiry is formulated, nor how the question is framed, 
modern writings constantly reveal the author’s ethical choice.  
 Take, for example, modern rational choice literature on the death penalty. Listen 
carefully. Beccaria, the first true rational choice theorist, did not believe that capital 
punishment fell within the domain of the sovereign’s right to punish, but instead within 
the domain of war, which, he argued, was ruled by necessity and utility. But the death 
penalty, according to Beccaria, served neither interest. It was not necessary because long-
draw-out punishments, such as penal servitude or slavery for life, were more effective 
                                                 
12 Joel Feinberg adopted a similar approach in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Feinberg avoided 
reference to harm in the context of prostitution, and suggested instead that an offense principle could 
plausibly restrict overtly erotic behavior, public acts of solicitation, and houses of prostitution (1985:43). 
The same offense principle, however, would not preclude private sexual conduct including prostitution.12 
Other contemporary liberal writers similarly relied on the offense principle rather than the harm principle. 
Herbert Packer, for instance, wrote: “It seems that prostitution, like obscenity and like other sexual 
offenses, should be viewed as a nuisance offense whose gravamen is not the act itself, or even the 
accompanying commercial transaction, but rather its status as a public indecency. That is the approach 
taken in England, where law enforcement does not seem to be plagued with the self-imposed problems that 
our prostitution controls engender” (Packer 1968:331). 
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and fear-inducing than the fleeting shock of death. It was also not useful because capital 
punishment had a brutalizing effect on society (1995: 67). Jeremy Bentham—the very 
spokesman for the theory of marginal deterrence in the modern era—agreed entirely: “the 
more attention one gives to the punishment of death the more he will be inclined to adopt 
the opinion of Beccaria—that it ought to be disused. This subject is so ably discussed in 
his book that to treat it after him is a work that may well be dispensed with” (Hart 1982: 
41).  
 Fast forward to the present. Christmas Day 2005. Here’s Gary Becker, perhaps 
the world’s leading rational choice theorist and Nobel-prize economist writing on his 
blog: “My belief in its deterrent effect is partly based on these limited quantitative 
studies, but also because I believe that most people have a powerful fear of death. David 
Hume said in discussing suicide that ‘no man ever threw away life, while it was worth 
living. For such is our natural horror of death…’. Schopenhauer added also in discussing 
suicide ‘…as soon as the terrors of life reach a point at which they outweigh the terrors of 
death, a man will put an end to his life. But the terrors of death offer considerable 
resistance…’” (Becker-Posner Blog, December 25, 2005). Richard Posner adds, also on 
Christmas Day: “I do not consider revenge an impermissible ground for capital 
punishment. Revenge has very deep roots in the human psyche” (Becker-Posner Blog, 
December 25, 2005).  
 It is almost funny to watch these moderns twist and contort themselves to justify 
their own ethical intuitions about killing other people. The only issue for a rational choice 
theorist is whether the death penalty actually deters homicides, net of any other effect. 
Becarria chose to believe that the brutalizing effect outweighed the deterrent effect. 
Becker chose to believe that people fear death. The empirical literature is all over the 
lot,13 yet Becker and Posner decide to believe those economists who find a deterrent 
effect. It’s remarkable to watch—though disheartening for those who once believed in the 
critical project of reason. 
 This is not to suggest that the rational choice theorists alone exhibit raw choice. 
Listen to Hegel: “Beccaria’s endeavor to have capital punishment abolished has had 
beneficial effects. Even if neither Joseph II nor the French ever succeeded in entirely 
                                                 
13 See John Donohue’s review of the literature and replication of the studies in the Stanford Law Review. 
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abolishing it, still we have begun to see which crimes deserve the death penalty and 
which do not. Capital punishment has in consequence become rarer, as in fact should be 
the case with this most extreme punishment” (247 emphasis added (note to paragraph 
100)). These are telling words. What they tell us, though, is not the right way to formulate 
the inquiry, nor the correct answer to the proper question, but something more 
fundamental about the personal convictions of the author—and how it is, exactly, that 
authors bridge the inherent indeterminacy of their own principles.  
 
 
4. 
 
These gaps and ambiguities will bury the modern period—or at least, they should. Even 
the sharpest of critics, the most radical thinkers have never been able to escape the 
overpowering urge to build some new construct, a new edifice, some bridge to get to the 
other side of knowledge. Neither the followers of Nietzsche, Durkheim, or Marx, nor the 
cultural critics were able to resist the lure of reconstruction, always cobbling together the 
“best evidence” to soften their landing. Not even Michel Foucault—that wisest of 
moderns—could resist displacing our faith in rehabilitation with a genealogical story—
one that required just as great a leap of faith. Tragically, this is as true of the cultural 
critics as it was of the two earlier inquiries.  
 Many have argued over the ages—and still do—that we should simply continue to 
live with our structure of knowledge and adjust our expectations of truth: that the not-yet-
falsified simply is the best model—which is, obviously, hard to dispute—and that we 
should continue to deploy reason to select the most robust empirical inferences and the 
most coherent deductions of principle. But the idea that we could distinguish between 
different hypotheses consistent with the data or principles based on what “makes the most 
sense,” “sounds the most reasonable,” or “seems the most coherent,” is simply fantastic. 
Those types of judgment are so culturally determined and so highly influenced by our 
particular time and place, it is inconceivable that any rational being today could possibly 
continue to make those statements at this late stage of modernity—at least, with a straight 
face.  
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 No more. It is too embarrassing to watch as one generation after another of 
moderns, under the banner of reason, hop, jump and skip over the gaps of knowledge. 
One would have thought that phrenology would have been sufficient to stop us in our 
tracks, but, no, instead we got biological determinist theories of social behavior applied to 
male rape, moral poverty theories of delinquency applied to super-predator black males, 
rational action theories applied to suicide bombers—and the list goes on and on of 
theories that require so many caveats and exceptions that even a child would question our 
modern claim to rationality.  
 We can no longer leap over the not-yet-falsified. It is no better than turning the 
clock back and resurrecting faith in divine providence. Foucauldian geneaology does not 
solve the problem: tracing the formation of belief represents nothing more than seducing 
us to believe another explanation for which there is hardly stronger evidence. It too 
requires a leap of faith. The cultural turn also solves nothing. The idea that we could 
interpret the social meaning of a contemporary punishment practice or institution—let 
alone a practice that occurred in a completely different historical and cultural context—is 
complete fantasy. The fact that the cultural interpretation is persuasive to us tells us a lot 
more about what we find convincing—how we categorize, what kind of evidence we find 
persuasive, what disciplines we defer to—than it does about the “social meaning” of the 
practice itself. And even when we do come to a rich description that makes sense of the 
world around us, even when we achieve that formidable task of symbolic interpretation, 
we are no closer to drawing normative conclusions. We are located precisely at the gap, 
forced to take a leap. The symbolic interpretation tells us nothing about how the practice 
came about, how to transform or change it, or how to modify its social meaning. Social 
meaning offers no purchase on action.  
 
 
5. 
 
Where does this leave us? Surprisingly, with several formidable tasks, which I would 
describe under the twin rubrics of social physics and randomization.  
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 Social physics 
 
 The first task is to triage all philosophical arguments, principled discourse, and 
social science findings, and save only those that involve social physics. By “social 
physics” I mean only those claims that are necessarily true as a result of the physical 
nature of our mortal existence. Theories that depend on the intermediation of human 
consciousness and decision-making should be set aside, left to deal with later when we 
have more leisure time or, perhaps, when we have made breakthroughs in those new 
consciousness studies. For the time being, though, we should focus on social physics 
only.  
 By way of illustration, let’s consider four theories dear to the field of crime and 
punishment: (a) rational choice theory, (b) the broken-windows theory, (c) legitimacy 
theory, and (d) incapacitation theory. The first three operate through the intermediary of 
human consciousness. In each case, the theories depend on actors believing certain things 
and conforming their behavior accordingly. The first assumes that individuals pursue 
their self-interest or maximize their utility, and that, accordingly, when the cost of 
offending goes up, they will offend less. It is a theory that requires us to accept the idea 
that individuals—whether knowingly or unconsciously—conform their behavior to 
calculated expectations of success or failure. The second and third theories—broken-
windows and legitimacy theories—also depend on people taking cues from their social or 
physical environment—a disorderly neighborhood in one case, a discourteous or insolent 
police officer in another—and adapting their behavior accordingly. All three of these 
theories require a defined process of the human intellect and a decision about behavior. 
They require the intermediation of human consciousness. They are neither true, nor false, 
just not-yet-falsified-properly, nor clearly falsifiable in the near future.  
 In contrast, the fourth theory involves social physics. If we physically detain an 
individual and isolate her from the free world, she will not commit statutory offenses on 
the outside. This is a matter of social physics, not modern social science. Similarly, 
transportation made it physically impossible for a convict to offend in the original 
jurisdiction. These types of theories alone are respectable hypotheses for the 21st century. 
To be sure, it narrows the range of acceptable empirical and principled claims. But that’s 
all for the better.  
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 Randomization 
 
 Naturally, claims of social physics do not resolve the policy choices. The fact that 
incapacitation or transportation makes it physically impossible for the convict to offend 
(at least, in the original jurisdiction) does not tell us how much incapacitation we should 
have. It takes us to another empirical and theoretical gap that simply cannot be bridged. 
Similarly, the triage and elimination of claims that rest of the intermediation of 
consciousness will leave us most often without any guidance, without any theory at all. 
There will be no “best evidence” to fill the void. How then shall we organize our political 
and social environment?  
 The answer is randomization. Where our theories of social physics run out, where 
we have swept away those other hypotheses that mediate through consciousness, we 
should leave the decision-making to chance. We should no longer take that leap of faith, 
but turn instead to the coin toss, the roll of the dice, the lottery draw—in sum, to 
randomization.  
 It turns out that this is far more difficult than it sounds at first. Practically every 
definitional term we use is loaded with different possible meanings, each of which 
reflects human choice. For instance, what does it mean exactly to distribute police 
resources “randomly”? Let’s say we generate a random computer program, what is the 
unit of choice that we should select? Is it a certain population density or self-identified 
neighborhoods, or police precincts, or is it related somehow to crime rates? The selection 
of the unit of analysis will have significant distributional consequences. Population 
densities and crime rates may not map onto neighborhoods, for instance, and the selection 
of any one of these units as the basis for randomization will affect people differently. 
How then do we even begin to select the unit of measurement for purposes of drawing 
straws? Could we deploy randomization here too? How would we implement this?  
 The answer has to be: Proceed with caution, be attentive to choice, and be 
prepared to correct the inevitable mistakes that will occur. Try to use as much brutal 
simplicity as possible to eliminate choice, but, where there is inevitable choice and 
indeterminacy, turn to chance. In many cases, it will be possible to eliminate the need for 
randomization simply by administering an intervention completely: instead of randomly 
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choosing who to search at the airport, search everyone. This, I take it, is a form of brutal 
simplicity that achieves the same benefits as chance, but avoids the temporary 
dislocations of randomization. By combining completeness, simplicity, and choice, it 
might be possible to resolve many of the indeterminacies—better.  
 First, in the realm of surveillance, searches and detection, law enforcement 
agencies could turn either to completeness or to random sampling. The Internal Revenue 
Service could audit tax returns at random using a social security number lottery system. 
The Transportation Security Administration could search every passenger at the airport, 
or randomly select a certain percent based on a computer generated algorithm using last 
names. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration could investigate compliance 
by employers randomly selecting on employer tax identification number. In these and 
other prophylactic law enforcement investigations, the agency could very easily replace 
profiling—which rests on uncertain assumptions about responsiveness and rational 
action—by randomization.  
 Second, in the area of choosing law enforcement priorities and crimes to target, 
law enforcement agencies could allocate resources by chance selection. The local district 
attorney’s office, as well as the federal prosecutor’s office, could select annual 
enforcement targets (as between, for instance, public corruption, insider trading, drug 
enforcement, or violent crimes) by lottery. State highway policing authorities could 
distribute patrol cars through a randomized mapping system using heavily-trafficked 
roads and interstate highways. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms could 
choose between equal-impact initiatives on the basis of an annual lottery draw.  
 Third, in the area of punishment and corrections, courts and prison administrators 
could rely more heavily on chance in sentencing and classification. Judges could impose 
a sentence following conviction, the length of which would be determined by random 
selection from within a legislatively specified sentencing range; the range, for instance, 
could be determined by felony classifications. The department of corrections could assign 
prisoners to facilities on a random basis within designated escape-risk or security-level 
categories. Prisoners in need of drug, alcohol, or mental health treatment could be 
assigned to comparable programs based on a lottery draw.  
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 This is not as far fetched as it may seem at first. Here is an illustration of how it 
might work. Take the case of someone found guilty of first degree murder defined as 
intentionally causing the death of another person without justification. Assume that the 
legislature has imposed a possible range of 15 to 25 years. If convicted, the sentencing 
judge would simply draw a number between 15 and 25 from an urn. The sentencing range 
would be determined by the fact that the offense is classified as a first-degree felony. 
That legislative classification would be based, most likely, on a determination of the 
gravity of the offense. The distribution of punishments would average 20 years, and 
individuals would serve between 15 and 25 years depending on the luck of the draw.  
 One possible consequence might be that we would limit the sentencing ranges. 
Randomness reflects an honest recognition that we really do not know whether the 
sentence will deter or not, rehabilitate or not, or do justice. By leaving the sentence to 
chance (within the range), we are effectively acknowledging our own limitations. 
Naturally, we would only want randomization between conceivable bounds, that is, 
within an acceptable range. But randomization would put pressure on the legislature to 
limit the range of possible theories that justify wider ranges of possible sentences. The 
wider the range of sentences, the clearer it is that we do not know what we are doing. 
Randomization might also limit the range of possible forms of punishment. There is no 
guarantee, of course. It is possible that we may develop a taste for lotteries. But my sense 
is that, in the field of crime and punishment, it would limit, rather than promote, the 
proliferation of policing and punishment practices. In all likelihood, it would leave us 
with imprisonment as the primary mode of punishment.  
 By chastening our knowledge claims, randomization may also subject our 
punishment practices to greater economic scrutiny. Today we invest an extraordinary 
amount of resources into the criminal justice complex. The State of California alone, for 
instance, spends over five billion dollars in corrections, which is about as much—at times 
more—than it spends on education. [Detail national costs]. Studies suggest that these 
investments in prisons helped reduce crime in the 1990s and that about 25 percent of the 
crime drop in the country was attributable to the exponential increase in incarceration. 
The day we fully acknowledge that we have no good idea whether this investment deters 
crime, rehabilitates convicts, or satisfies the urge for retribution, it may be far easier to 
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assess the economic impact of the investment in more dispassionate and simple economic 
terms.  
 
6. 
 
 Randomization is by no means foreign to the law. There are a number of instances 
in which we turn to chance to resolve legal or political disputes. A number of states 
statutorily prescribe a flip of the coin to resolve election ties. Wisconsin law, for instance, 
provides that “If 2 or more candidates for the same office receive the greatest, but an 
equal number of votes, the winner shall be chosen by lot in the presence of the board of 
canvassers charged with the responsibility to determine the election.”14 Similarly, 
Louisiana law expressly states that “In case of a tie, the secretary of state shall invite the 
candidates to his office and shall determine the winner by the flip of a coin.”15 In New 
Mexico, it’s a poker hand that resolves a tie.16 Courts as well have turned to chance to 
resolve election disputes.17 A number of courts also partition disputed land by lot or 
chance.18   
 Randomness also surfaces across a number of policing strategies, including 
sobriety checkpoints and the random selection of airline passengers for further screening 
at airports. Even efficiency-oriented police administrators at times oppose targeted 
profiling of higher-risk suspects. New York City’s police commissioner, Raymond Kelly, 
for instance, opposes ethnic profiling in defensive counterterrorism measures such as 
stop-and-search programs at New York City subway entrances (see Harcourt 2007b). We 
have become increasingly accustomed to randomized searches in a number of different 
areas, including “the compelled provision of urine samples for drug testing of law 
                                                 
14 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 5.01(4) (2005). See generally Jesse H. Choper, “Why the Supreme Court Should Not 
Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000,” 18 Constitutional Commentary 335, 340 n.22 (2001) 
(collecting the following other sources: Mo. Rev. Stat. 162.492 (2000) (1978 Amendment deleted former 
subsec. 6, which provided that a tie vote would be determined by the flip of a coin); N.D. Cent. Code 16.1-
11-38, 16.1-14-0, 16.1-15-29, 40-21-17, 58-04-15 (2000) (“In case of a tie vote the nominee or nominees 
must be determined by a coin flip... .”)). Special thanks to Adam Samaha for these insights.  
15 La. Rev. Stat. 46:1410(C)(3) (2005).  
16 Reuters, “Election 2000; The Presidency; High Stakes; If Vote is Tied in New Mexico, Poker Hand 
Could Settle It,” Newsday A05 (Nov. 15, 2000) (describing practice of using “one hand of five-card 
poker”); N. M. Stat. Ann. 1-13-11 (2000) (“candidate chosen by lot ... in the event of a tie vote”).  
17  See e.g. Huber v. Reznick, 437 N.E.2d 828, 839 (Ill. App. 1982) (holding that trial court did not err in 
choosing a coin flip as the method of determining the winner of the tie vote by lot).  
18 See generally Jay M. Zitter, “Judicial Partition of Land by Lot or Chance,” 32 American Law Reports 4th 
909 (Updated March 1999 Annotation). 
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enforcement officers, jockeys, railroad workers, and other classes of employees” 
Edmond. We have also become accustomed to metal detectors and x-ray machines that 
screen practically all people entering government buildings or embarking on planes.  
 Chance also plays a large role in the detection of crime: who gets apprehended 
and who does not most often turns on luck. As R.A. Duff writes, “One burglar is caught 
because the police are mounting a blitz on burglaries in that area at that time; another 
escapes detection because he happens to commit his burglary at some other place or time. 
. . .  In these and other ways the actual fate within the criminal system of two equally 
guilty offenders may be partly a matter of chance: one loses our in the criminal lottery, 
while the other wins” (1990:26—27). Yet few of us object to these “detection lotteries.” 
Few of us find that they seriously infringe on our sense of justice.19  
 
 Efficiencies and Deterrence 
 
 Nevertheless, a call for more randomization will undoubtedly meet with great 
resistance. Many will instinctively protest that the use of chance is far less efficient than 
profiling or targeting higher offenders—that it is wasteful to expend law enforcement 
resources on low-risk offenders. There’s no point conducting extra airport security checks 
on elderly grandmothers in wheelchairs and families with infants—or “Girl Scouts and 
grannies,” as one recent commentator writes (Sperry 2005). As I demonstrate elsewhere 
with equations and graphs,20 however, profiling on the basis of group offending rates may 
in fact be counterproductive and may actually cause more crime even under very 
conservative assumptions regarding the comparative elasticities of the different 
populations. We have no good theoretical reason to believe that targeted enforcement 
would be efficient in decreasing crime or would increase, rather than decrease, overall 
social welfare. 
 More sophisticated economists may respond that targeting enforcement on groups 
that are more responsive, at the margin, would maximize the return of any law 
                                                 
19 There are also historical instances of randomness in sentencing. One is the decimation of a military 
regiment as a form of punishment for mutiny. “Each soldier is punished for his part in the mutiny by a one-
in-ten risk of being put to death. It is a fairly pure penal lottery, but not entirely pure: the terror of waiting 
to see who must dies is part of the punishment, and this part falls with certainty on all the mutineers alike” 
(Lewis 1989:58). 
20 Harcourt 2007a, Against Prediction; Harcourt 2007b. 
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enforcement investment. But here, we face an empirical void. What we would need is 
reliable empirical evidence concerning both the comparative offending rates and the 
comparative elasticities of the targeted and non-targeted populations.21 That evidence, 
however, does not exist. The problem is not the reliability of the evidence, it’s that it 
simply does not exist.22 If there ever was a place to avoid taking leaps of faith, surely it 
would be here, where there is no empirical data whatsoever.   
 On the sentencing side, the conventional wisdom among law-and-economists is 
that increasing the probability of detection serves as a greater deterrent to crime than 
increasing the amount of the sanction because of the high discount rate imputed to 
criminals. Along these lines, it is generally argued that “it is plausible that young males 
who commit crimes discount the future disutility of imprisonment at a higher rate than 
the social discount rate, which also suggests that limited prison sentences and relatively 
high probabilities are optimal” (Polinsky and Shavell 1999:12). In this equation, the 
decision to embrace randomization in sentencing should have no effect on deterrence. 
Using a sentencing lottery to determine the length of incarceration from within a 
sentencing guideline range, rather than using a grid that profiles on prior criminal history, 
gun use or other factors, would not change the certainty of the expected sentence and 
need not set the amount of the expected sentence.  
 The certainty of the expected sentence is going to be the same whether we employ 
a random lottery or a mechanism that profiles on a characteristic. Imagine, for instance, a 
sentencing range of 10 to 20 years for murder. Under a random lottery, a person 
convicted of murder can be certain that the expected sanction is 15 years. Under a 
sentencing scheme that profiles on prior criminal history, a person with a prior can be 
certain that the expected sanction will be, say, 18 years, and a person without a prior can 
be certain that the expected sanction will be, say, 12 years. The certainty is the same 
                                                 
21 I provide the formula at Harcourt 2007a:133.  
22 There may be one single exception in the universe. Avner Bar-Ilan and Bruce Sacerdote have a working 
paper from 2001 that explores the comparative responsiveness to an increase in the fine for running a red 
light along several dimensions (finding that the elasticity of red light running with respect to the fine “is 
larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars,” equivalent for drivers “convicted of violent offenses 
or property offenses,” and smallest, within Israel, for “members of ethnic minority groups”). A handful of 
other papers come close, but do not address the key issue of comparative elasticities. So, for instance, Paul 
Heaton’s 2006 working paper on the effect of eliminating racial profiling policies in New Jersey on the 
offending of minorities, “Understanding the Effects of Anti-profiling Policies,” does not address how the 
elasticity of black offenders compares to that of whites.  
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under either scheme. The introduction of a lottery does not change those certainties of 
sentence, though it may change the expected amount of the sentence for different 
populations. But it need not. It is up to the designer of the lottery to determine the 
expected sentence. That is within the entire control of the policy maker. As a result, from 
a conventional law and economics approach, a sentencing lottery would not necessarily 
have a negative impact on deterrence.23     
 Some behavioral law and economists have argued, however, that the certainty of a 
criminal sentence—the fact that the size of a criminal sanction is fixed and known ahead 
of time—is likely to deter criminals more effectively than uncertain sentences and, on 
those grounds, have argued against sentencing lotteries. Alon Harel and Uzi Segal 
contend that criminals prefer sentencing schemes in which the size of the sentence is 
uncertain and the probability of detection and conviction is certain, and, for this reason, 
that policymakers should adopt just the opposite (1999:280). (In later work with Tom 
Baker and Tamar Kugler—work involving actual experimental research—Alon Harel 
found that uncertainty regarding a sanction is more effective at deterring deviant 
behavior. The results from their experiments suggest that a sentencing lottery would be 
more effective (Baker, Harel and Kugler 2003).24 Here, however, I am addressing the 
arguments against randomization and so will focus on the earlier theoretical argument 
against sentencing lotteries).  
 Harel and Segal offer the following hypothetical to support their case against 
sentencing lotteries. Imagine two possible sentencing schemes. Under the first, the 
convict is sentenced to five years in prison. Under the second, the convict is subject to a 
lottery with a 50% chance of receiving two years in prison and a 50% chance of receiving 
eight years in prison. Harel and Segal assume a certain discount rate, and then calculate 
                                                 
23 Some in fact argue that introducing randomization in sentencing may in fact increase deterrence because 
the criminal may not perceive risk of detection as a game of chance. David Lewis writes, “The criminal 
might think of escaping punishment as a game of skill—his skill, or perhaps his lawyer’s. For all we know, 
a risk of losing a game of chance might be much more deterring than an equal risk of losing a game of 
skill” (Lewis 1989:60).  
24 Their research builds on experimental research on taxpayer compliance, ranging from Jeff T. Casey and 
John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision Theory and Tax Compliance, Law & Society 
Review 25:821 (1991) back to Michael W. Spicer and J. Everett Thomas, Audit Probabilities and the Tax 
Evasion Decision: An Experimental Approach, Journal of Economic Psychology 2:241 (1982).  
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the marginal utility that a convict would receive from being out of prison during the next 
few years. They posit that a five year sentence would involve a loss of utility of 90; a 
two-year sentence, a loss of utility of 39; and an eight year sentence, a loss of utility of 
132. On average, the sentencing lottery represents a loss of utility of 85.5—less than the 
loss of 90 associated with the fixed sentence of five years. Not surprisingly, Harel and 
Segal find, on these assumptions, that the potential convict “will prefer the sentencing 
lottery to the uniform sentencing scheme” (296). Harel and Segal write: 
 
The reason that criminals prefer a sentencing lottery is that, if sent to prison, the 
convicted person has to surrender first the next few years, namely, those years 
that have the highest marginal utility. Thus, if a person is sentenced to five years 
in prison, she surrenders the next five years. If, on the other hand, she faces a 
lottery, she gains a larger benefit from the possible beneficial outcome, for 
instance two years in prison, than the loss resulting from the undesirable 
outcome, for instance eight years in prison. These considerations clearly suggest 
that in cases in which the sanctions involve imprisonment, individuals prefer 
sentencing lotteries over a uniform sentencing scheme. (1999:297) 
 
 The trouble is, in this scenario, Harel and Segal have stacked the deck against the 
sentencing lottery by assuming that it has, on average, lower disutility. They are not 
comparing comparable sentencing scenarios. If instead we assume different discount 
rates that render the two alternatives comparable, or alternatively restructure the lottery 
so that its disutility is equivalent to that of a fixed five-year sentence, then there is no 
reason to believe that criminals would necessarily favor a sentencing lottery. It depends 
on their attitude to risk and how those preferences compare to the discount rate implicit in 
the lottery. Whoever designs the sentencing lottery can make it more or less attractive.  
 Harel and Segal note that psychological experiments have shown individuals to be 
averse to ambiguity—defined here as “uncertainty with respect to probabilities that 
certain states of affairs will materialize” (1999:291)—and for this reason argue that the 
best solution for enforcement is to misrepresent the likelihood of detection so that 
individuals overestimate the expected sentence. “An optimal legal system is therefore a 
system that disguises as much as possible the probability of sentencing. Ambiguity with 
respect to the probability of sentencing is a desirable feature of our enforcement 
mechanism” (1999:304). But the question of ambiguity is orthogonal to the choice 
between a sentencing lottery and targeted sentencing. Both a pure sentencing lottery and 
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a sentencing scheme that targets persons with prior convictions (or other profiles) have 
the same level of certainty, even if the expected sentence is different. As noted earlier, in 
both scenarios, the certainty of the expected sentence will be the same: using the example 
above, in a pure lottery, the murder convict has an expected sentence of 15 years; in the 
targeted scheme, the murder convict with a prior record can expect 18 years, and the first 
timer 12 years. The certainty is the same, and it is up to the designer of the lottery to 
determine all expected sentences. Even assuming bounded rationality, a sentencing 
lottery would not necessarily have a negative impact on deterrence.25   
 
 Just Punishment and Moral Luck 
 
 Randomization in sentencing will likely meet much greater resistance, though, not 
because of efficiency concerns but rather because of considerations of fairness, just 
punishment, and desert. At least, it has in the past. In one notorious incident in 1982, a 
state court judge in Brooklyn, New York, used a coin toss to determine a jail sentence 
(Shipp 1983a; Resnick 1984:610). The judge, Alan Friess, was presiding over the 
criminal sentencing of a defendant convicted of pocketpicking. The parties were plea-
bargaining over a sentence of 30 days in jail—which Friess was inclined to impose—or 
20 days—which the defendant obviously preferred, when Friess offered the defendant a 
gamble. “I’m prepared to allow you to decide your own fate,” Friess reported told the 
defendant, “and if you’re a gambling man, I’ll permit you to flip a coin for that purpose.” 
Heads, the defendant would get 30 days, tails, 20. The defendant agreed, called tails, and 
won. Freiss sentenced him to 20 days (Van Natta 1996).  
 The legal establishment responded swiftly. Friess was charged with judicial 
misconduct for the coin toss,26 and resigned while the charges were pending. Despite his 
resignation, the state commission on judicial conduct held hearings to determine whether 
to bar Friess from ever serving again as a judge in New York. A couple of judges 
defended Friess. One reportedly testified that a coin toss “is no more bizarre than the way 
in which I have seen [sentencing] done on thousands of occasions” (Shipp 1983b). 
                                                 
25 Moreover, as Harel and Segal recognize well, even fixed sentencing schemes have a significant element 
of chance. For instance, a lot will turn on the luck of the draw regarding which judge—lenient or stern—
presides over the sentencing. The same is true for many other factors (Harel and Segal 1999:292). 
26 The complaint alleged one other incident: apparently, on another occasion, Friess asked courtroom 
spectators for a show of hands on whom to believe in a harassment case (Shipp 1983). 
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Another judge, Louis Rosenthal, also from the Brooklyn bench, confessed using a similar 
approach to speed up the arraignments of individuals charged with dealing three-card 
Monte. Rosenthal testified that he’d give dealers the choice between pleading guilty or 
playing a hand themselves. He’d then write down three outcomes on separate pieces of 
paper: a $500 fine, 30 days in jail, or discharge. “I’m going to mix up these papers, and 
he’s going to pick one,” Rosenthal testified. “They would always plead guilty—they were 
afraid of the 30 days. . . They knew the odds were against them” (Herman and Johnston 
1983). (Rosenthal also resigned from the bench.) 
 The commission was not impressed and came down hard on Friess, finding that 
he had “exhibited extraordinarily poor judgment, utter contempt for the process of law 
and the grossest misunderstanding of the role and responsibility of a judge in our legal 
system. . . . He has severely prejudiced the administration of justice and demonstrated his 
unfitness to hold judicial office.” Friess was barred from ever serving again as a judge in 
New York (Shipp 1983a). 
 “A court of law is not a game of chance,” the commission declared. “The public 
has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue and, in good 
faith, render reasoned rulings and decisions. Abdicating such solemn responsibilities, 
particularly in so whimsical a manner as respondent exhibited, is inexcusable and 
indefensible” (Shipp 1983a).  
 The few legal commentators who have opined on these matters tend to agree—or 
at least suggest that we, as a community, would tend to agree. “We insist upon deliberate, 
self-conscious decisionmaking,” Judith Resnik suggests. “The coin flip offended this 
society’s commitment to rationality. Whether or not a judge’s mental processes, when 
pronouncing a sentence of twenty or thirty days, actually amount to anything more than a 
mental coin flip, the community wishes judicial rulings to appear to be the product of 
contemplative, deliberate, cognitive processes” (Resnik 1984:610–11).  
 This reflects—accurately, I believe—our general unease with chance in criminal 
sentencing. Wherever chance plays a role, there is controversy. The rules surrounding 
attempt liability, for instance, have spawned a large and controversial literature. The 
difference between an attempt and the completed offense is usually the product, factually, 
of pure luck—whether a bullet misses its target, whether a bomb fails to detonate. These 
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are cases where, in the words of David Lewis, the punishment “leaves something to 
chance” and we have come to view them as “a disguised form of penal lottery” (Lewis 
1989:58). There are a number of other cases that involve the luck of the draw, and these 
too are the more controversial legal doctrines. Charges of reckless endangerment differ 
from the more serious completed offense often because of lucky circumstances; the 
defense of impossibility entirely immunizes criminal intent when, by chance, the 
intended harm factually could not have occurred;27 and the felony-murder doctrine may 
trigger based on the chance behavior of an accomplice. These and other legal rules that 
intersect chance—such as intervening causation and the thin-skulled victim—tend to be 
the ones that draw the strongest criticism (see generally Kadish 1994; Kessler 1994).  
 A large body of philosophical and legal literature has grown around the issue of 
luck in criminal sentencing,28 some of it tied to the larger debate over what Thomas 
Nagel coined “moral luck.”29 Most of the commentators oppose the use of chance. 
Sanford Kadish calls attempt liability a “rationally indefensible doctrine” that “does not 
serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law” (1994:680). David Lewis 
concludes that “there is no adequate justification for punishing attempts more severely 
when they succeed” (1989:58). Another commentator declares that “we must adopt a 
solution that takes a clear stance on luck—that it does not matter” (Kessler 1994:2237). 
And yet, as a legal matter, the role of luck has been universally embraced in this country 
and in the West. Most jurisdictions in the United States impose a lesser sentence or half 
the punishment for attempts; beyond our borders, reduced punishment for attempts has 
achieved “near universal acceptance in Western law” (Kadish 1994:679).  
 Why, then, this almost universal intuition against luck in criminal sentencing? 
The reason, I would suggest, is because we believe that there is a rational alternative. We 
continue to believe that there is a better way, a more rational way, a more morally 
acceptable way. In discussing penal lotteries, R.A. Duff observes that lotteries are 
generally justified, from the perspective of fairness or justice, only when “there is no 
                                                 
27 The impossibility defense is now no longer the majority rule. See, e.g., Kadish 1994:683.  
28 See, e.g., Lewis 1989; Duff 1990; Kadish 1994; Kessler 1994; Von Hirsch 1976:72—73. For a sampling 
of earlier works on the issue of attempt liability and luck, including texts by H.L.A. Hart, Andrew 
Ashworth, Michael Davis, George Fletcher, and Stephen Schulhofer, see the list of texts compiled at 
Kadish 1994:680 n.5. 
29 Nagel 1979:24—38; see also Bernard Williams, Moral Luck 20—39 (1981).  
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other practicable or morally acceptable way of distributing the benefit or burden in 
question” (Duff 1990:26). Lotteries are justified as a default mechanism when there is no 
other morally justifiable way: “What justifies such lotteries. . . is the fact that it is either 
impossible to eliminate them, or possible to reduce or eliminate them only at an 
unacceptably high cost” (Duff 1990:27). 
 Duff has it right. What justifies lotteries, morally, is the lack of an alternative. 
Where he has it wrong, though—and where everyone seems to have it wrong—is in 
believing that there is a rational alternative. The fact is, we have hunches. We take leaps 
of faith. But we do not have good evidence or determined principles that resolve the 
sentencing ambiguities. Sentencing lotteries make sense, in the end, precisely because we 
have no better choice.  
 
7. 
 
 Looking forward, it may be possible to tease together randomization, social 
physics, brutal simplicity, and, wherever possible, completeness, into a larger framework 
for the criminal justice system. The common gesture underlying these different 
impulses—especially the turn to randomization—is to question and ultimate reject social 
engineering through the crime sanction. Stopping to take leaps of faith means nothing 
more, in practice, than stopping to engineer persons and social relations through 
punishment practices. Here, then, would be a seven-point plan to brutally simplify our 
criminal justice sphere and stop, once and for all, trying to reshape, correct, deter or 
engineer the next generation: 
 
1. Draft every young adult citizen for two years of civil service and assign twenty-
five percent by lot to assist local police departments in providing security 
services. Another ten percent to provide security at prisons. 
2. Distribute law enforcement resources across sub-jurisdictions in proportion to 
population numbers and annually select and set enforcement priorities for 
undercover operations (as between, for example, public corruption, insider 
trading, drug trafficking, or violent crime) by lottery. 
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3. Tax every citizen at a flat rate based on gross revenue and audit at random using a 
social security number lottery system. 
4. For corporations and government employers who adopt internal surveillance 
programs (audits, drug tests, etc.), administer the surveillance on a lottery basis 
and include all employees, executives, cabinet or board members—everyone.  
5. At all counter-terrorism check-points—from international airports to subway 
entrances and bus terminals—administer searches either on every passenger and 
traveler, or on the highest percent possible chosen at random. 
6. Sentence convicts to a fixed term of incarceration by drawing straws, the length of 
which are determined by a legislatively fixed sentencing range. 
7. Classify prisoners to different prisons within their prescribed level of prison 
security (prescribed proportional to the perceived gravity of the offense) by 
lottery. 
  
 To be sure, we would still need to decide how much money to spend on prison 
building. We would still need to decide how much of the budget to allocate to law 
enforcement. But the decision would no longer turn on fictitious empirical claims. 
Instead, it would be what it has always been: taste. Taste that would reflect either the 
result of a democratic vote or a totalitarian decree. We would have to decide how many 
prisoners we were comfortable incarcerating. And it would be no different for other 
choices: how much order or disorder we like, how much family and community 
dislocation we can tolerate. These decisions would revert to their rightful realm: 
aesthetics, taste, and feelings for others—whether compassion or misanthropy. What we 
would have eliminated, though, is the fictitious and misleading social engineering. 
 As for reading and debating the work of contemporary moderns, in the twenty-
first century we must focus on interruptions in the answers people offer, not on the 
questions they pose or even simply the answers they give. We must explore what their 
leaps of faith tell us about their desires, their forms of rationality, and their intuitions of 
just punishment. The task is to unmask and expose their choices about punishment. None 
of the three modern questions were geared toward unmasking this choice—even the 
second, most critical question. They all effectively hid choice. The key now is to refocus 
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the inquiry not on answering the questions, but on exploring the answers that are given. 
For it is the answers that tell us the most. The task of reading the moderns, then, is to 
decipher what their answers tell us about their desires and reasoning on matters of just 
punishment.  
 
8. 
 
Moderns came in different flavors. There were those who didn’t really notice they were 
taking a leap of faith. They worked through problems with reason—deriving principles, 
making empirical findings, drawing policy conclusions—without ever noticing that they 
were bridging some gap or ambiguity. There were those who spent all their time 
excavating the gaps and ambiguities, and then offering explanations for the leaps of 
faith—explanations which themselves always ended up bridging another gap. There were 
those who heard the voice of critical reason, but who adamantly denied that they were 
making any choices. And then there were those who believed they were, indeed, making 
a leap of faith, but felt there was no other option in the human domain and tried as best 
they could to render transparent their ethical choices.  
 We can think of these as stages of modernity: from early enlightenment, to critical 
theory, to positivist social science, to cultural critics, to postmodern ethicists. I myself 
have passed through many of them. Until recently, I truly believed that we should just 
accept the inevitable leaps of faith in human knowledge, but make them transparent. That 
we had to “dirty our hands” by setting out fully the ethical choices we make whenever we 
draw conclusions and advocate for public policies. My work, like that of many other 
poststructuralists—Foucault especially at the end of his life—had taken a turn to ethics 
and to the cultivation of the self. It seemed that there was no other option but to recognize 
human frailty and proceed more honestly. 
 No more. No more leaps of faith. There is an alternative. Whenever we are at the 
precipice of reason, faced with competing empirical hypotheses that have not been 
falsified or an indeterminate principle, or questionable assumptions, we need to stop 
using reason: stop rationalizing which hypothesis makes more sense, stop marshalling 
better reasons for one derivation of principle over another, stop legitimizing the 
questioned assumption. Turn instead to chance. Resolve the indeterminacy by drawing 
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straws, flipping a coin, pulling numbers from a hat, running a randomized computer 
algorithm. We need to let chance take over when reason ends.  
 The end of modernity is within our reach. The final triumph of rationality is near. 
Reason has finally achieved that exalted state of self-consciousness that can allow it to 
identify its own extremity and stop there: no longer to rely on blind faith in itself to 
bridge the inevitable gaps, ambiguities, and indeterminacies of human knowledge; no 
longer to fill that space beyond the non-falsified hypothesis; ready to relinquish that 
realm to chance, the coin toss, randomization—the arbitrary. 
 It is also, in some sense, the end of punishment as a transformative practice—as a 
practice intended to change mortals, to correct delinquents, to treat the deviant, to deter 
the super-predator. We have sanitized punishment: no longer the field of social 
engineering—but also no longer about moral education, nor about social intervention. 
Punishment is unplugged and defused.  
 
* * *  
 
 Iris Marion Young urged me this past summer, in her subtle yet penetrating way, 
to use this opportunity to explore what a world without punishment would look like. I 
think I have seen it now. It is not a world without anything that could be described as 
punishment. The person convicted of murder or identity theft may still be sentenced and 
incarcerated. But it is a world in which we have ceased to punish in furtherance of 
hunches and unfounded theories—in which punishment is chastened by randomization.   
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